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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess whether greater participation of venture capital/private
equity (VC/PE) funds in the companies’ capital structure at the moment of initial public offering (IPO)
contributes to the reduction in the underpricing of their shares.
Design/methodology/approach – Descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, mean difference test
and cross-sectional regression were used. The final sample consisted of 89 companies making IPO in Brasil
Bolsa Balcão between 2007 and 2017.
Findings – The participation of VC/PE funds was shown to mitigate the effect of information asymmetry on
managers and shareholders, thus reducing the underpricing of companies at the moment of IPO (H1).
However, the expectation that a greater participation of these funds promotes further reduction in a potential
underpricing (H2) was not confirmed.
Research limitations/implications – One can highlight the small amount of IPOs during the sampling
period due to the occurrence of international and national economic crises, as well as the difficulty in
obtaining information on the participation of VC/PE funds in the companies’ capital structure.
Practical implications – It was observed that information asymmetry had amitigating effect from the presence
of these funds in the companies, which can improve the pricing of their shares, decrease the costs and make volume
captions viable for investments, in addition to giving credibility to the market information effectiveness.
Originality/value – This study differs from others in that it assesses not only the influence of VC/PE funds
on the reduction of the underpricing of IPO shares, but also the participation of these funds in the capital of
these companies.
Keywords Underpricing, Initial public offering, Brasil Bolsa Balção, Cross-sectional regression,
Mean differences, Venture capital and private equity funds
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Between 2007 and 2017, the Brazilian economy underwent periods of oscillation with
increase and decrease in the gross national product, thus directly affecting the basic interest
rates (SELIC rate) and hampering the access to credit (Bacen, 2018a, b). In periods of crisis,
one can highlight the role played by funds of venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE).
These funds work as a financial alternative for ventures with high potential of growth and
risk. In fact, investments made by these funds were R$13.3bn in 2014, R$18.5bn in 2015 and
R$11.3bn in 2016 (ABVCAP, 2018).
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Initial public offering (IPO) is among the most common forms of VC/PE investment funds
and whose life cycle lasts, on average, from two to seven years. According to Cumming and
Johan (2008), the presence of VC/PE investment funds in companies contributes to reducing
the information asymmetry in the market. In order to do so, fund managers submit the
prospective companies to due diligence processes and other analyses for assessment of risks
and opportunities. Therefore, companies receiving such investments are viewed as more
reliable by non-fund investors, thus creating a quality stamp to their IPO.
According to Miller and Reilly (1987), underpricing is a way for market operators to
compensate for the lack of information at the moment of IPO. Also, Sonoda (2008)
materialises this concept by stating that underpricing is an under-estimation of or discount
in share prices in relation to the actual market price. As for IPO, specifically, this occurs
when its offering price is lower than that on the first day of negotiation. Therefore,
underpricing can be understood as the difference between closing price and offering price of
IPO share on the first day of negotiation. For Ribeiro (2005), Gioielli (2013) and Sonoda
(2008), the presence of VC/PE funds decreases the information asymmetry between owners
and investors so that the effect of underpricing on IPOs can be mitigated in companies
relying on the participation of these funds.
According to Belghitar and Dixon (2012), companies with prior participation of VC/PE
funds are considered to be of low risk. Therefore, emitters do not need to under-price their
IPO shares in order to attract investors. It is also thought that VC/PE funds regularly
include IPO companies in their portfolios so that they have a strong incentive to establish a
reliable reputation. This enables them to access the IPO market in the future under
favourable conditions. Finally, the reputation of credibility helps these funds to establish a
strong relationship with all offering participants, namely, auditors, insurers, pension fund
managers and institutional investors.
In view of the above, the objective of this study is to assess whether the presence of VC/P
funds in invested companies contributes to reducing the underpricing of their shares at the
moment of IPO. The resulting hypotheses are:
H1. Companies with prior participation of VC/PE funds have less underpricing of IPO
shares compared to those without such participation.
H2. The greater the prior participation of VC/PE funds in these companies’ capital, the
less the underpricing of IPO shares.
Therefore, the population of companies making IPO in the Brasil Bolsa Balcão (B3) between
2007 and 2017 were considered. The hypotheses were verified by using descriptive
statistics, correlation analysis, mean difference tests and cross-sectional regression,
including their assumptions. Differently from other studies, this one is concerned with
capturing the sensibility regarding the participation of VC/PE funds in the companies’
capital structure before their IPO. Either high or low level of property has different impacts
on the underpricing of these companies. From the market’s perspective, this fact suggests
that the simple presence of these funds cannot have the expected effect on the mitigation of
a potential asymmetry between managers and owners, in addition to other conflicts
regarding the market information effectiveness. Also, the recent crisis in the country’s
economy might shed light on the relevance of these funds as alternative development
sources in the Brazilian market.
2. Literature review
Underpricing can be identified by means of abnormal positive returns from shares in the
initial negotiations. This fact means that the company is evaluated for a value lower than
the potential one, thus enabling profitability for investors in the first days of negotiation.
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Therefore, underpricing is regarded as an indirect cost for the company because part of the
offer is not collected. This phenomenon is termed in the finance literature as “leaving cash
on the table” and can be measured by the number of shares multiplied by the difference
between closing price in the first day of negotiation and the initially offered one (Ibbotson,
1975; Miller & Reilly, 1987; Tiniç, 1988; Leal & Lemgruber, 2000; Loughran & Ritter, 2002).
There is still no definitive explanation on underpricing. A view on this theme supports
that underpricing occurs due to market imperfections regarding the IPO process, that is, the
existence of information asymmetry among investors. For Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and
Spatt and Srivastava (1991), the book building acts as a mechanism for data extraction so
that adverse selection among investors can be reduced. These data are useful in the pricing
of shares and set accuracy to the value being determined. The book-building practice
enables the underwriters to obtain more information from better-informed investors
(Cornelli & Goldreich, 2003). For Drake and Vetsuypens (1993), on the other hand,
underpricing occurs due to legal liability. Underwriters use the book-building process in
order to avoid legal problems in case of lack of clarification on something relevant in the IPO
prospects. According to Taranto (2002), in turn, underpricing occurs due to the fact that
executives who possess stock options can have fiscal benefit with the reduction of share
prices in the first day of negotiation.
With regard to the concept of VC/PE funds, Takahashi (2006) states that VC funds are
those invested in companies operating in new markets (NM), preferably the ones with a bold
and entrepreneurial stance. In addition, VC funds enable companies to position themselves
in a competitive market environment despite their difficulties to obtain credit lines due to
their low level of net equity (Engel, 2002; Leite & Souza, 2001). On the other hand,
investments of PE funds are aimed at large-sized companies with high growth potential.
This investment is directly negotiated between funds and managers by means of a private
placement. The financing of companies by means of VC/PE funds is aimed at providing
capital for them and aggregating value through administrative participation (Barry, 1994;
Takahashi, 2006; Sonoda, 2008).
In Brazil, VC funds are regulated under the normative instruction number 209/94 (CVM,
1994), whereas PE funds are regulated under the normative instruction number 391/03 (CVM,
2003). According to Carvalho, Furtado and Ribeiro (2006), the participation of VC/PE funds in
the Brazilian market began in the 1990s due to the country’s economic stability resulting from
the Real Plan. The second cycle of this industry occurred in the 2000s when 71 VC/PE funds
invested in 306 companies. Today, there are 157 VC/PE funds in Brazil (ABVCAP, 2018).
VC/PE funds have the reputation of being involved in the control of the company’s
activities. Wruck (2008) states that these funds add new management methodologies to the
market, which, in turn, are applied to the invested companies. The VC/VE funds make
investments in target companies, that is, those with management problems or inefficiency.
According to Williamson (1967) and Jensen (1986), these funds understand that excess of
free cash flow and high capitalisation are signs of poor management by the company.
The market’s positive perception of the presence of VC/PE funds in companies is related
to the theory of agency. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), financing decisions are
affected by the fact that the companies’ owners delegate the management to fund agents.
In this way, it is not possible to ensure that the fund agent will always make a great financial
decision under the company managers’ point of view. Mechanisms of control, corporate
management, variable remuneration for managers, indebtedness, among others, are
established in order to conciliate the interests of managers with those of shareholders. This
set of measures is termed agency costs. The theory of agency points to the existence of
information asymmetry between managers and owners.
Barry, Muscarella and Peavy (1990) found that companies with VC/PE fund investment
are better positioned in the financing market before IPO compared to those with no
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participation of these funds in their capital structure. It is believed that companies belonging
to the portfolio of these funds provide superior quality in the moment of IPO as a result of
the reduced agency conflicts. For Saito and Silveira (2008), this occurs because of the
concentration of functions as the same person plays the roles of manager and owner, which
condenses the efforts for maximisation of the shareholders’ wealth.
Another positive aspect highlighted in the literature regarding the presence of VC/PE
funds in the company’s capital structure is the mitigation of information asymmetry. This
occurs when two or more fund agents make an economic transaction in which one of the
parts involved holds more information than the others. Information asymmetry is one of
the main market failures occurring when it is difficult or very expensive to obtain relevant
and precise data on the quality of traded goods. This fact alters the market balance and
resource allocation (Akerlof, 1970; Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2011).
Rock (1986) identified that non-informed investors are more inclined to invest in IPO
shares with underpricing as they can wait longer until the shares become well valued. In
turn, Megginson and Weiss (1991) pointed to the decrease in the information asymmetry
when companies have participation of VC/PE funds in their capital structure. Therefore, one
expects that these companies’ IPO shares suffer less underpricing than those without
participation of these funds.
Another aspect affecting the underpricing of shares is their negotiation in the
differentiated segment of the NM of B3 (2017). Companies issuing shares in this segment
are subject to more rigid rules of corporate management and transparency, thus reducing
the information asymmetry between the parts. Fernandes (2007) associated the performance
of companies in this segment to the reduction of underpricing, since the market provides
reliability and protection to the company’s minority shareholders. In addition, companies
with better earnings margin before interest and taxes (EBIT) are more likely to better
perform during the IPO period, which reduces potential noises on the entity and mitigates
information asymmetry-related problems (Fernandes, 2007).
The issue of information asymmetry still points to the occurrence of two types of problems,
namely, adverse selection and moral hazard (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1985).
According to Lima, Rodrigues, Silva, and Silva (2012), adverse selection occurs because the
manager has information unknown by the investors, whereas moral hazard refers to the
likelihood of an economic agent changing his or her behaviour depending on the context in which
the economic transaction occurs. In turn, Galozzi (2014) states that managers have information on
the companywhich is unknown to themarket. Therefore, in the IPO period, shares are negotiated
with higher price because of the optimism on partial information. This may lead to underpricing,
but the presence of VC/PE funds can mitigate these types of problems in order to decrease the
information asymmetry and consequently both adverse selection and moral hazard.
As for the signalling impact of VC/PE funds on the market, it should be clarified that
the theory of signalling evidences the existence of indicators, which enable to decrease the
problem of information asymmetry (Spence, 1973). Megginson and Weiss (1991) pointed out
that the presence of VC/PE funds provides signals to the market about the quality of the
company, thus reducing information asymmetry and allowing investors to attest the quality
of a possible IPO. According to the authors, this occurs due to factors such as: commitment
of the VC/PE funds to the invested companies; relationship of fund agents with auditors,
underwriters and investment managers; and reputation of the VC/PE funds.
Minardi, Ferrari, and Tavares (2013) stated that the presence of VC/PE funds can provide
signals of good future performance as these fund models have a short lifetime and need
resources to keep their business. In this way, they need to identify promising companies and
good managers in order to develop and expand their business. Moreover, it is important to
ensure that these companies have a good performance over time as they are always making
IPOs and ensuring the quality of the next ones.
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For Galozzi (2014), there are both well- and ill-informed investors about the company.
In order to attract those with low-quality information and ensure successful IPOs, the shares
are offered at prices systematically lower than the expected value. This fact implies greater
underpricing or high cost of placement. As a way of mitigating this undesired effect, the
founder should have a high level of property in the company following the offer in order to
signal to the market that he or she believes in the company’s success in the future. Another
way of avoiding such high costs is to have VC/PE funds in the company’s capital structure,
thus mitigating noises and ensuring the veracity of the share values.
Finally, another aspect influencing the IPO decision is the market moment. In a study
conducted by Baker and Wurgler (2002), they found that companies tend to issue shares
during windows of opportunity in which the own capital cost is relatively lower than that of
other sources of capital. Therefore, North-American companies tend to issue more shares
than debt securities when the stock market value is higher than its patrimonial value. This
moment is defined as market timing.
Lucas and McDonald (1990) showed that companies opt to make IPOs at periods of
heated market, which adds value to negotiated shares. The prediction of the market timing
is associated with the ability to analyse the share price movement in the market based on
the macro-economic view of exchange and taxation policies (Fama, 1970). For Baker and
Wurgler (2002), the theory of market timing shows that the company’s capital structure is
the result of past attempts by managers to take advantage of favourable conditions of the
stock market, in which new shares are issued when they are perceived as over-valued by the
market and re-purchased when perceived as under-valued. The performance of IPO shares
is related to the current market moment. A lower underpricing is expected in periods of high
appreciation (Oliveira & Kayo, 2015).
This can be evidenced by the existing negative relationship between market-to-book
value rate and leverage of the company. As the market value of the company surpasses its
book value, new shares are issued to the detriment of debts. The opposite occurs when the
market value is lower than the book value. Underpricing of shares in the IPO period is
equally affected by the ideal market moment. When there is a large (or small) number of
IPOs, this period is termed as hot (or cold) market. The hot market usually occurs when
companies are well evaluated, resulting in a high number of IPOs. According to Rossi and
Marotta (2010), 83 per cent of the Brazilian companies made IPOs in hot market periods and
17 per cent of them opened their capital in cold market periods between 2004 and 2007. The
total volume of resources obtained in hot market periods was higher by 17 per cent than that
in the cold market periods. Ritter (1984) adds by stating that there is a higher incidence of
underpricing in the periods of hot market.
Table I shows a synthesis of these studies in which underpricing is the dependent
variable. The expected signals of independent and control variables are supported by the
above-cited theories. In sum, one can observe that there are divergent results on the prior
participation of VC/PE funds in the reduction of underpricing of shares following the IPO
period (H1). Foreign studies showed a great number of significantly negative results, as
expected, whereas national studies reported no statistically significant results. With regard
to control variables, Megginson and Weiss (1991) found more consistent results for market
share, IPO lead co-ordinator and company age before IPO. Most of the other studies had no
statistical significance and this fact corroborates the need for new studies on the theme.
3. Methodology
The population of interest consists of all companies opening their capital (IPO) in B3
between January 2007 and December 2017. The final sample comprised 89 companies, with
58 having participation of VC/PE funds in their capital structure before IPO and 31 having
no type of investment. Evolution of these companies is presented in Table II. Capital IQ is
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Synthesis of
the results of
empirical studies
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the main database, being produced by the Standard & Poor’s. However, Economatica and
Comdinheiro databases were also used for complementing the missing data.
Data were assessed by using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, cross-sectional
regression and mean difference test. The variables assessed and their descriptions are
presented, respectively, in the regression model of the first equation and Table III. Initially,
the descriptive statistics of the data are presented in order to understand populations and
samples. According to Fávero, Belfiore, Silva and Chan (2009), descriptive statistical
measures are aimed at studying central position measurements (i.e. mean, median, mode and
dispersion), standard deviation, variance, amplitude, asymmetry and kurtosis.
Description Total
Initial sample 112
(−) Companies with EBIT margin greater than 100% 1
(−) Companies without information on their capital structure before IPO 12
(−) Companies without EBIT margin 10
(¼ ) Final sample 89
Table II.
Sample evolution
Code Description Type
Expected
sign Formula Components
UND Underpricing Dependent na UND¼ (P1−P0)/P0 P1¼ closing price on the first
selling day
P0¼ offer price on the day of IPO
PFUN Prior
participation
of VC/PE
funds before
IPO
Independent − PFUN¼NAF/NTA NAF¼ number of shares
belonging to VC/PE funds before
IPO
NTA¼ total number of
circulating shares after IPO
VOL Volume of
IPO shares
sold
Control − VOL¼Ln (VV) Ln¼Naperian logarithm
VV¼Volume of IPO shared sold
MKC Market share
of IPO lead
co-ordinator
Control − MKC¼NOC/NTO NOC¼ number of share offers
managed by the lead co-ordinate
NTO¼ total number of share
offers in the market
IDA Company’s
age before
IPO
Control − IDA¼Ln (AE) Ln¼Naperian logarithm
AE¼Years of the company’s
existence before IPO
RM Market return
rate in the
IPO period
Control + RM¼ (IBOV1−IBOV0)/
IBOV0
IBOV0¼ Ibovespa points on the
day before IPO
IBOV1¼ Ibovespa points on the
day of IPO
ME EBIT margin
in the year
before IPO
Control − ME¼EBIT/Revenues EBIT before IPO
Revenues¼ net sales income in
the year before IPO
DNM New market
dummy for
IPO
Control − Dummy for
differentiated listing
segment of new market
in the stock exchange
1¼ If the company belongs to the
new market on the day of IPO
0¼ If the company does not
belong to the new market on the
day of IPO
Table III.
Description
of the variables
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Next, one has verified signal, value and statistical significance of the correlation. Correlation
analysis consists in assessing two variables and how they related to each other in order to
quantify the power and direction of the existing relationship between them (Dinardo &
Johnston, 2001; Fávero et al., 2009). In the present study, correlation analysis had two
objectives: to verify the existence of a potentially high correlation between dependent and
independent/control variables and to identify a potentially high multicollinearity between
independent/control variables. If it exists, then the regression model should confirm it.
Next, the regression model (see the first equation) is applied to test the hypothetical
assumptions with normality and homoscedasticity of residuals, linearity of parameters and
absence of high multicollinearity between explicative variables (Corrar, Paulo, & Dias Filho,
2006; Sweeney, Williams and Anderson, 2013). The application of the cross-sectional
regression was aimed at verifying H1: companies with prior participation of VC/PE funds
have less under-priced shares during the IPO period compared to those without such
participations. As a robustness test, a non-parametric mean difference test using
independent samples was performed:
UNDi ¼ b0þb1PFUNiþb2VOLiþb3MKCiþb4IDAiþb5RMiþb6MEiþb7DNMiþui; (1)
where β0 is the linear coefficient; β1–7 the angle coefficients; i the companies; u the error term.
Finally, the H2, in which the higher the participation of VC/PE funds in these companies
the less the underpricing of their shares during the IPO period, was tested by using the
Wilcoxon’s sign test for companies with participation of VC/PE funds in their capital
structure before IPO. In this test, the numerical values of the difference between each
pair were calculated, resulting in three possible conditions: increase (+), decrease (−) or
equality (¼ ). Once all differences between the values obtained for each pair of data have
been calculated, the differences were ordered by their absolute value (i.e. without sign) so
that the original values could be replaced by their respective position in the ordered scale.
The test of the hypothesis of equality between the groups is based on the sum of positions of
negative and positive differences. The null hypothesis states that mean values are equal,
whereas the alternative hypothesis states that the mean values are not equal (Wilcoxon,
1945; Siegel & Castellan, 2006).
Of the companies with participation of VC/PE funds in their capital structure before IPO,
one can identify those with positive underpricing. Next, these companies were distributed in
quartiles in which the first (Q1) and fourth (Q4) quartiles were those with less and greater
participation of VC/PE funds, respectively. After this classification, the mean difference test
is applied to underpricing of the companies (Q4–Q1).
4. Analysis of the results
Tables AI and AII present the main characteristics of the companies making IPOs, which
were grouped depending on having or not having VC/PE funds, respectively. In turn,
Table IV briefly lists other overall characteristics of the IPOs in our sample. One can
observe that lead co-ordinating banks UBS Pactual, Itaú BBA and Credit Suisse are those
extensively operating in the IPO market. However, by analysing the quality of these
positions and considering IPOs with participation of VC/PE funds, it is noted that Merrill
Lynch is the most highlighted. Another interesting aspect is the concentration of positions
in the years of 2007 and 2011, which were the periods preceding the systemic crises initiated
in the USA and Europe by contagion effect. From 2014 on, there was a low incidence of
IPOs in Brazil as a result of economic problems, which recovered in 2017. One can also
highlight that the majority of IPOs occur in the differentiated segment of corporate
management of the NM. At last, about 60 per cent of the IPOs occur in companies older
20 years – a fact explaining one of the reasons for the reduction of information asymmetry.
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With regard to the descriptive statistics of the variables composing the Equation (1), one can
see in Table V that the mean underpricing is 2.3 per cent in the period, with minimum and
maximum values of −37 and 43 per cent, respectively. The participation of VC/PE funds has
a mean value of 7.1 per cent in the total sample. Minimum value of 0 represents the
31 companies without participation of these investment funds before IPO. In addition,
General
characteristics
Total sample With prior participation
of VC/PE funds
No prior participation
of VC/PE funds
Lead co-ordinator No. of
firms
Total
(%)
Rank No. of
firms
Total
(%)
Participation
(%)
Rank No. of
firms
Total
(%)
Rank
UBS Pactual 24 27.0 1st 14 24.1 7.404 6th 10 32.3 1st
Itaú BBA 21 23.6 2nd 18 31.0 10.444 5th 3 9.7 3rd
Credit Suisse 17 19.1 3rd 9 15.5 12.220 3rd 8 25.8 2nd
Merrill Lynch 6 6.7 4th 5 8.6 25.909 1st 1 3.2 5th
Bradesco BBI 5 5.6 5th 4 6.9 5.621 7th 1 3.2 5th
JP Morgan 5 5.6 5th 3 5.2 17.197 2nd 2 6.5 4th
Santander 4 4.5 6th 1 1.7 0.010 9th 3 9.7 3rd
Unibanco 3 3.4 7th 1 1.7 0.002 11th 2 6.5 4th
Citibank 2 2.2 8th 1 1.7 0.012 10th 1 3.2 5th
BB Investimento 1 1.1 9th 1 1.7 0.018 8th 0 na na
Morgan Stanley 1 1.1 9th 1 1.7 11.568 4th 0 na na
Total 89 100 na 58 100 na na 31 100
General
characteristics
Total sample With prior participation
of VC/PE funds
No prior participation
of VC/PE funds
IPO year No. of
firms
Total
(%)
Rank No. of
firms
Total
(%)
Rank No. of
firms.
Total
(%)
Rank
2007 42 47 1st 21 36 1st 21 68 1st
2008 2 2 6th 2 3 6th 0
2009 5 6 5th 3 5 5th 2 6 3rd
2010 7 8 4th 4 7 4th 3 10 2nd
2011 11 12 2nd 9 16 2nd 2 6 3rd
2012 2 2 6th 1 2 7th 1 3 4th
2013 9 10 3rd 8 14 3rd 1 3 4th
2014 1 1 7th 1 2 7th 0 na na
2015 0 na na 0 na na 0 na na
2016 1 1 7th 1 2 7th 0 na na
2017 9 10 3rd 8 14 3rd 1 3 4th
Total 89 100 na 58 100 na 31 100 n/a
General
characteristics
Total sample With prior participation
of VC/PE funds
No prior participation
of VC/PE funds
Listing segment No. of
firms
Total
(%)
Rank IPO
year
No. of
firms
Total (%) No. of
firms
IPO
year
Rank
NM 71 80 1st 50 86 1st 21 68 1st
N1 9 10 2nd 5 9 2nd 4 13 3rd
N2 9 10 3rd 3 5 3rd 6 19 2nd
Total 89 100 58 100 31 100
General
characteristics
Total sample With prior participation
of VC/PE funds
No prior participation
of VC/PE funds
Company’s age
before IPO (in years)
No. of
firms
Total
(%)
No. of firms Total (%) No. of firms Total (%)
o5 11 12 8 14 3 10
5–9 12 13 10 17 2 6
10–20 13 15 6 10 7 23
W20 53 60 34 59 19 61
Total 89 100 58 100 31 100
Table IV.
General characteristics
of IPOs
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lead co-ordinators represent a mean value of 18.2 per cent of the total number of offers in
the market. At last, it is worth highlighting that the mean EBIT margin was 22 per cent in
the year before IPO of the companies.
Table VI shows the correlation analysis of the variables in the econometric model in
Equation (1). One can see that the greater the participation of VC/PE funds in the
companies’ capital structure, the less their underpricing in the IPO period. This result
is in accordance with H1. In addition, contrary to the expected, there is a significantly
positive relationship between volume of IPO shares and underpricing. At last, no
significantly high positive correlation was identified between explicative variables,
which should point to a lack of high multicollinearity in the tests of assumptions in the
cross-sectional regression model.
For analysis of the results in the cross-sectional regression model, it is necessary,
before all, to test their assumptions. Although normality of the residuals was not
identified, the Gauss–Markov theorem showed that estimators of ordinary least squares
are still the best linear unbiased estimators as they have minimum variance (Gujarati,
2006). Moreover, the value of the variance inflation factor is 1.06, being lower than 10. This
fact indicates lack of high multicollinearity between explicative variables. Furthermore,
the Breusch–Pagan test indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity of the residuals,
which was corrected by means of robust standard errors. The linearity of coefficients was
verified by considering a significant econometric model as a whole, with F-test having a
value of 2.26 per cent.
Table VII shows that there is a significantly negative relationship between prior
participation of VC/PE funds in the capital structure and underpricing of companies in the
IPO period. This fact confirms the theories of agency and information asymmetry.
According to them, the presence of VC/PE funds in the company’s capital structure reduces
the information asymmetry, thus mitigating potential conflicts between managers and
shareholders. This occurs when the roles of manager and owner are played by the same
person, which, in turn, condensates his or her efforts to maximise the shareholders’ wealth.
It is worth highlighting that for each 1 per cent increase in the participation of VC/PE funds
in the capital structure, there is a reduction of 0.10 per cent in the underpricing of the
companies. Furthermore, this result is in accordance with Megginson and Weiss (1991),
Bruton, Chahine and Filatotchev (2009) and Mogilevsky and Murgulov (2012). Therefore,
H1 was observed.
With regard to the control variables, the significantly positive relationships between
volume of IPO shares and IPO lead co-ordinator are contrary to those expected by the
theories of market timing and signalling, respectively. These same results were also
reported by Sonoda (2008) and Altynnikova and Sarampasina (2017). The other control
variables had not statistical significance. In addition to the regression model test, a
non-parametric mean difference test using independent samples was performed, indicating
robustness. As a result, one can observe that the underpricing of companies without prior
Variable Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
UND 89 0.023033 0.109351 −0.37 0.43
PFUN 89 0.071906 0.156612 0 0.94
VOL 89 18.35292 1.141 14.09 21.08
MKC 89 0.182022 0.099660 0.02 0.32
IDA 89 2.98191 1.138152 0 4.72
RM 89 −0.000003 0.013934 −0.047481 0.031618
ME 89 0.222134 0.203148 −0.031 0.78
Table V.
Descriptive statistics
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participation of VC/PE funds was statistically higher (p¼ 0.2823) than that of invested
companies before IPO, thus confirming H1.
Finally, Table VIII shows analysis of H2, which was performed by using the Wilcoxon’s
sign test. Of the 58 companies having participation of VC/PE funds in their capital structure,
32 have negative or zero underpricing and 26 have positive underpricing prior IPO
participation. These 26 companies with positive underpricing were classified into four
quartiles (Q), in which Q1 contained companies with less participation of funds and Q2
contained those with greater participation. It was expected that the difference between Q4
and Q1 resulted in a statistically negative value different from zero. Companies in Q4 had
less underpricing compared to those in Q1. However, the null hypothesis was accepted as
the mean values were statistically equal, meaning that H2 could not be confirmed.
5. Conclusion
In Brazil, the participation of VC/PE funds is increasingly more relevant as an option of
financing for companies, mainly in view of the current economic recession scenario. IPO is
among the most common ways of VC/PE fund investments. In this process, one can
sometimes observe the occurrence of underpricing, that is, an under-evaluation of the prices
of shares in relation to their real market price. Nevertheless, the presence of VC/PE funds
invested in companies contributes to reducing the information asymmetry in the market by
fund managers.
Therefore, the present study is aimed at assessing whether the presence of VC/PE
funds in invested companies contributes to reducing the underpricing their shares in the
Variables Coefficient Robust SE t-statistics p-value 95% confidence interval
PFUN −0.1097558 0.049038 −2.24 0.028 −0.2073261 −0.0121855
VOL 0.0239245 0.011303 2.12 0.037 0.001435 0.046414
MKC 0.1088828 0.0488404 −2.23 0.029 −0.2060598 −0.0117058
IDA 0.0037503 0.0087164 0.43 0.668 −0.0135925 0.0210932
RM 0.4087845 0.8126132 0.50 0.616 −1.208061 2.02563
ME 0.0682422 0.066457 1.03 0.308 −0.0639865 0.2004708
DNM 0.0041684 0.0276983 0.15 0.881 −0.0509425 0.0592794
Const −0.4565914 0.23257 −1.96 0.053 −0.9193327 0.0061499
Obs 89
R2 0.1366
F(7, 81) 2.50
ProbWF 0.0226
Note: Values in italic are statistically significant at 5 per cent of level
Table VII.
Cross-sectional
regression analysis
Q4 Observations Rank sum Expected
0 7 57.5 52.5
1 7 47.5 52.5
Combined 14 105 105
Unadjusted variance 61.25
Adjustment for ties −0.27
Adjusted variance 60.98
H0 und (q4¼ ¼ 0)¼ und(q4¼ ¼ 1)
z 0.640
ProbW |z| 0.5220
Table VIII.
Mean difference test
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IPO period. The resulting hypotheses were the following: H1 – companies with prior
participation of VC/PE funds have less underpricing of IPO shares compared to those
without such participation, and H2 – the greater the prior participation of VC/PE funds in
these companies’ capital, the less the underpricing of IPO shares. In order to examine its
pertinence to the Brazilian market, a final sample of 89 companies making IPO in B3
between 2007 and 2017 was considered. The tests applied were the mean difference test
between companies with prior participation of VC/PE funds and those without such
participation, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and cross-sectional regression with
validation of hypotheses.
As a result, H1 was confirmed. The statistically significant negative relationship of prior
participation of VC/PE funds in the companies indicates to the market that these funds
have an effective involvement with the corporate management. This fact can mitigate
agency-related problems, thus reducing information asymmetry and consequently the
under-evaluation of the company based on a value lower than the potential one in the IPO
period. This result is supported by Megginson and Weiss (1991), Bruton et al. (2009) and
Mogilevsky and Murgulov (2012), being characterised as an evolution in relation to the
Brazilian studies conducted by Fernandes (2007) and Sonoda (2008).
With regard to H2, it was observed that it was not confirmed. Nevertheless, it should
be highlighted that among the companies with participation of VC/PE fund, only 26
(45 per cent) had positive underpricing, which limits the sample size and may have
influenced our results. In this way, this is the first original contribution of the present
study showing that either a high or a low level of property has different impacts on the
underpricing of these companies.
With regard to theoretical aspects, the present study contributes to the empirical
analysis of the participation of VC/PE funds in the companies’ capital structure before the
IPO period, thus being an instrument to mitigate the information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders as well as to indicate the quality of these companies and
re-affirm the reputation of these funds. As for the economic and commercial impacts, one
can observe that this mitigating effect allows to better price the shares, which reduces costs
and makes volume captions viable for investments, in addition to giving credibility to the
market information effectiveness.
However, the present study has a limitation in that a small amount of IPOs was used
during the sampling period because of national and international economic crises.
In addition, one can highlight the difficulties in obtaining information on the participation of
VC/PE funds in the companies’ capital structure, among other reasons, due to business
combinations. At last, it is suggested that the relationship with other characteristics of
VC/PE funds affecting the underpricing of the companies should be analysed, such as date
of establishment, nationality and number of invested companies before IPO.
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Appendix 1
Year Company
Listing
segment Volume R$ Date of IPO Operating segment
Lead co-
ordinator
2007 Rodobens NM 91,935,670 31 January 2007 Building construction JP Morgan
Camargo
Corrêa
NM 116,011,470 31 January 2007 Building construction Credit Suisse
GVT NM 359,916,150 16 February 2007 Fixed telephony Credit Suisse
Anhanguera N2 187,898,540 12 March 2007 Educational services Credit Suisse
Heringer NM 59,911,110 12 April 2007 Fertilisers and
pesticides
UBS Pactual
JHSF NM 43,512,160 12 April 2007 Building construction Credit Suisse
Metalfrio NM 60,138,700 13 April 2007 Electrical equipment UBS Pactual
Bematech NM 151,073,110 19 April 2007 Computers and
equipment
Itaú BBA
AGRA NM 131,162,080 26 April 2007 Building construction Credit Suisse
Cremer NM 143,800,150 30 April 2007 Medications and
other products
Merrill Lynch
Sofisa N1 84,027,910 2 May 2007 Banks UBS Pactual
Paraná N1 1,313,360 14 June 2007 Banks UBS Pactual
Cruzeiro do
Sul
N1 97,059,840 26 June 2007 Banks UBS Pactual
Daycoval N1 173,614,250 29 June 2007 Banks UBS Pactual
Indusval N2 39,084,130 12 July 2007 Banks Credit Suisse
Redecard NM 670,726,050 13 July 2007 Diverse financial
services
Unibanco
ABC N2 91,562,500 25 July 2007 Banks UBS Pactual
Springs NM 47,767,640 27 July 2007 Threads & fabrics Credit Suisse
Providência NM 48,725,640 27 July 2007 Diverse materials UBS Pactual
General
Shopping
NM 45,306,270 30 July 2007 Real estate business JP Morgan
Sul América N2 53,450,330 5 October 2007 Insurance services Unibanco
Subtotal 2,697,997,060 21
2009 Sul América N2 932,766,250 7 October 2009 Banks Santander
Cetip NM 261,788,030 28 October 2009 Diverse financial
services
Itaú BBA
Subtotal 1,194,554,280 2
2010 EcoRodovias NM 78,087,380 1 April 2010 Toll road services Itaú BBA
Julio Simões NM 25,610,200 22 April 2010 Road transport Bradesco BBI
Renova N2 5,357,880 13 July 2010 Electrical energy Santander
Subtotal 109,055,460 3
2011 Sonae NM 66,473,440 3 February 2011 Real estate business Credit Suisse
Autometal NM 51,233,060 7 February 2011 Road materials Santander
Subtotal 117,706,500 2
2012 Unicasa NM 35,366,070 25 April 2012 Real estate business BTG Pactual
Subtotal 35,366,070 1
2013 Biosev NM 14,865,490 15 April 2013 Sugar and alcohol BTG Pactual
Subtotal 14,865,490 1
2017 Petrobrás NM 766,169,446 15 December
2017
Oil exploration,
refinement and
distribution
Citibank
Subtotal 766,169,446 1
Total 4,935,714,306 31
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Year Company
Listing
segment Volume R$ Date of IPO Operating segment
Lead
co-ordinator
2007 PDG NM 107,740,910 26 January 2007 Building construction UBS Pactual
Tecnisa NM 189,215,700 1 February 2007 Building construction Credit Suisse
Iguatemi NM 250,514,760 7 February 2007 Real estate business UBS Pactual
São Martinho NM 163,826,230 12 February 2007 Diverse foods UBS Pactual
JBS NM 244,733,260 29 March 2007 Meat and derivatives JP Morgan
Even N1 45,270,100 2 April 2007 Building construction Itaú BBBA
Pine N1 96,212,800 2 April 2007 Banks Credit Suisse
BR Malls NM 136,210,410 5 April 2007 Real estate business UBS Pactual
SLC NM 72,237,400 15 June 2007 Diverse foods Credit Suisse
Log-In NM 238,891,170 21 June 2007 Waterway transport UBS Pactual
EZTEC NM 120,477,790 22 June 2007 Building construction UBS Pactual
Marfrig N1 77,383,410 29 June 2007 Meat and derivatives Merrill
Lynch
Tegma NM 67,776,300 3 July 2007 Road transport JP Morgan
Minerva NM 149,000,600 20 July 2007 Meat and derivatives Credit Suisse
TPI NM 157,819,930 23 July 2007 Toll road services Credit Suisse
MRV NM 360,083,930 23 July 2007 Building construction UBS Pactual
Multiplan NM 97,159,890 27 July 2007 Real estate business UBS Pactual
Estácio NM 56,751,600 30 July 2007 Educational services UBS Pactual
Tenda N1 124,169,070 15 October 2007 Building construction Itaú BBBA
Trisul N1 49,015,550 15 October 2007 Building construction Morgan
Stanley
Helbor NM 17,408,860 29 October 2007 Building construction Bradesco
BBI
Subtotal 2,821,899,670 21
2008 Hypermarcas NM 81,819,300 18 April 2008 Diverse products Citibank
Le Lis Blanc NM 17,993,250 29 April 2008 Fabrics, clothing and
footwear
Merrill
Lynch
Subtotal 99,812,550 2
2009 Visanet NM 670,726,050 29 June 2009 Diverse financial services Unibanco
Direcional NM 29,792,720 19 September 2009 Building construction Santander
Fleury NM 163,257,660 17 December 2009 Medical and diagnostic
services
Bradesco
BBI
Subtotal 863,776,430 3
2010 Aliansce NM 25,689,720 29 January 2010 Real estate business BTG Pactual
BR
Properties
NM 45,561,050 8 March 2010 Real estate business Itaú BBA
Mills NM 52,496,220 16 April 2010 Serviços diversos Itaú BBA
Raia NM 301,211,320 20 December 2010 Medications Itaú BBA
Subtotal 424,958,310 4
2011 Arezzo NM 309,359,700 2 February 2011 Fabrics, clothing and
footwear
Itaú BBA
QGEP NM 146,964,850 9 February 2011 Oil exploration/refinement Itaú BBA
International
Meal
NM 15,631,400 9 March 2011 Restaurant and similar
services
BTG Pactual
Time For
Fun
NM 62,814,860 13 April 2011 Events and show
production
Credit Suisse
Magazine
Luiza
NM 143,468,800 2 May 2011 Household appliances Itaú BBA
Brazil
Pharma
NM 72,685,700 27 June 2011 Medications BTG Pactual
(continued )
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Year Company
Listing
segment Volume R$ Date of IPO Operating segment
Lead
co-ordinator
Qualicorp NM 141,035,710 29 June 2011 Medical and diagnostic
services
Merrill
Lynch
Technos NM 47,172,780 1 July 2011 Accessories Itaú BBA
Abril N2 34,496,800 26 July 2011 Journals, books and
magazines
Credit Suisse
Subtotal 973,630,600 9
2012 Companhia
Locação
NM 9,029,300 23 April 2012 Automobile renting Itaú BBA
Subtotal 9,029,300 1
2013 Linx NM 251,882,210 6 February 2013 Software and services Credit Suisse
Alupar N2 97,371,030 24 April 2013 Electric energy Itaú BBA
Smiles NM 332,832,240 29 April 2013 Loyalty programmes Credit Suisse
BB
Seguridade
NM 1,430,522,490 29 April 2013 Insurance services BB
Investments
CPFL NM 10,776,440 19 July 2013 Electric energy Merrill
Lynch
Anima NM 81,554,280 28 October 2013 Educational services Itaú BBA
SER NM 73,033,520 29 October 2013 Educational services BTG Pactual
CVC NM 55,323,170 9 December 2013 Travels and Tourism Itaú BBA
Subtotal 2,333,295,380 8
2014 Ouro Fino NM 52,291,129 21 October 2014 Medications and products JP Morgan
Subtotal 52,291,129 1
2016 Imagem
Diagnósticos
NM 122,334,647 28 October 2016 Medical and diagnostic
services
Itaú BBA
Subtotal 122,334,647 1
2017 Movida NM 68,711,487 8 February 2017 Automobile renting Bradesco
BBI
Hermes
Pardini
NM 213,521,317 14 February 2017 Medical and diagnostic
services
Itaú BBA
Azul N2 292,446,466 11 April 2017 Air transport Itaú BBA
Carrefour NM 509,619,074 20 July 2017 Foods Itaú BBA
Omega NM 93,796,916 31 July 2017 Electric energy BTG Pactual
IRB NM 318,090,881 31 July 2017 Insurance services Bradesco
BBI
Camil NM 179,141,094 28 September 2017 Diverse foods Merrill
Lynch
BK NM 369,823,387 18 December 2017 Restaurant and similar
services
Itaú BBA
Subtotal 2,045,150,622 8
Total 7,701,028,016 58Table AII.
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